CHINAMacroReporter

June 24, 2021
'China steps up crackdown on bitcoin mining industry'
‘China’s latest intervention places further pressure on what was once one of the world’s most vibrant markets for trading and mining digital currencies.’ ‘It comes at a time when many governments are scrutinising the industry’s effect on the environment and determining the types of financial oversight that should be applied to cryptocurrencies.’
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June 24, 2021
'Congress on China: Then and Now'
‘With the Senate voting on June 8, 2021, to adopt the United States Innovation and Competitiveness Act, it is safe to say that this is the most comprehensive action by Congress on China policy EVER.’ ‘The language of the United States Innovation and Competitiveness Act is about a long-term competition with China as opposed to war with an enemy.’
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June 24, 2021
'Hong Kong’s Apple Daily newspaper folds under government pressure'
Apple Daily was much more than a newspaper. To its fans, it was a defender of freedoms. To its foes, it was the defiler of national sovereignty.’
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June 24, 2021
The End of 'Apple Daily' - and Freedom of the Press in Hong Kong
Through arrests and freezing of assets, Beijing has forced the closing of Hong Kong’s last pro-democracy newspaper, the Apple Daily.
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June 20, 2021
‘Why do business and political leaders in the West persist in getting China so wrong?’
From that I suggested that to invest successfully in China, you have to understand – and be aware of - what those differences are.
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June 20, 2021
‘Why do business and political leaders in the West persist in getting China so wrong?
‘Why do business and political leaders in the West persist in getting China so wrong?’
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June 17, 2021
'Back-to-Back Rebukes of China Mark a Turning Point'
‘The one-two punch of public criticism smacks directly into Mr. Xi’s assertion that China won’t stand for lecturing by other nations, suggesting anxiety in key capitals is prompting governments to seek alignment with the U.S. over attempting to manage the relationship with Beijing on their own.’
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June 17, 2021
'Meet the New Chinese Economy, Same as the Old Chinese Economy'
If a recovery led by investment in real estate and industrial production, with consumption lagging behind, sounds familiar, it may be because the same could be said of the makeup of China’s growth before Covid-19.’
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June 17, 2021
Part 1 | 'Is China exporting inflation?'
‘Beijing is moving swiftly to protect its factories and workplaces from rising costs.’ ‘Still, rising prices in China, by far the world’s biggest manufacturer and exporter, could be felt around the world.’
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June 17, 2021
Bernie Sanders: 'Don’t Start a New Cold War With China'
‘The pendulum of conventional wisdom in Washington has now swung from being far too optimistic about the opportunities presented by unfettered trade with China to being far too hawkish about the threats posed by the richer, stronger, more authoritarian China that has been one result of that increased trade.’
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June 17, 2021
Part 2 | 'Is China exporting inflation?'
“Is China exporting inflation? In renminbi terms, it’s not so obvious. But in U.S. dollar terms, it starts to get more sizable.” ’
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June 13, 2021
'Forget about China': Clyde Prestowitz
Clyde Prestowitz has influenced U.S. foreign trade and investment policy for many decades, both inside and outside government.
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June 9, 2021
'Joe Biden Worries That China Might Win'
‘Biden worries that China is in competition for America, and not only that—they might win. This belief underpins the Biden doctrine.’
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June 9, 2021
'From the G7 to a D-10: Strengthening democratic cooperation for today's challenges'
‘A “Democratic-10” or “D-10” is aimed at rallying the world’s most powerful democracies around a common cause— advancing a rules-based democratic order based on shared values and common interests.’
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June 9, 2021
Biden Worries China Might Win
‘Biden has taken the vital first step of correctly diagnosing the strategic challenge facing the country.’ ‘Like Harry Truman at the start of the Cold War and George H. W. Bush at its end, the president now has an opportunity to create a framework for a new era.’
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June 9, 2021
Joe Biden: 'My trip to Europe is about America rallying the world’s democracies'
‘This is a defining question of our time: Can democracies come together to deliver real results for our people in a rapidly changing world?’
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June 9, 2021
'NATO & China's Challenges to Europe'
‘Even though China does not pose a direct military threat to NATO, contrary to Russia or terrorist groups, Beijing’s growing economic influence and diplomatic assertiveness in Europe coupled with its growing military relationship with Russia do have major implications for the transatlantic economy as well as its security.’
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June 3, 2021
5 | Two Caveats
‘Highlighting the strategic questionability of China’s policies doesn’t mean that Beijing’s fears of the outside world are completely unjustified.’
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June 3, 2021
1 | 'Wolf Warriors Killed China’s Grand Strategy—and We'll All Come to Miss It'
‘The predominant feature of Chinese conduct today is not grand strategy but a belligerent, defensive nationalism that lashes out without heed of consequences.’ Sometime in 2020, China came unmoored from its grand strategy.
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June 3, 2021
4 | Why China Abandoned Its Grand Strategy
‘The most persuasive explanation is that China has poisoned itself through its own rhetoric.’
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June 3, 2021
6 | The Risks & the Dangers
‘The real danger is that once toxin has spread through the system, there is no knowing where it will end.’
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June 3, 2021
2 | Blame It on Xi
‘In China’s case, the Xi era has seen the accumulation of somewhat counterproductive policies that catalyzed a breakdown.’
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June 3, 2021
3 | Enter the ‘Wolf Warriors’
‘What changed in 2020 was that nationalism for its own sake became the predominant motif of Chinese conduct.’
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June 3, 2021
Killing China's Grand Strategy
Trend: Under the Xi Jinping administration, China has amped up abrasive ‘Wolf Warrior’ diplomacy; cracked down within its borders, despite protests and criticisms from other countries; become increasing bellicose in responding to those protests and criticisms, and any other pushback it doesn’t like; and increased its aggressive rhetoric and actions against neighbors. Risks: If this sounds like a problem just for the world’s Ministries of Foreign Affairs, think again – the impact extends deep into business and finance.
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May 30, 2021
'Final Thoughts'
'Just as Brzezinski foresaw the two new contending blocs –– requiring greater “geostrategic skill” –– that are forming today, Kissinger has emphasized the unprecedented dangers that AI could introduce into a divided world.’
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May 30, 2021
China's ‘Anti-Hegemonist Bloc’
‘To counter U.S. coalition building, China has enhanced its diplomatic, economic, and military relationship with both Russia and Iran in recent months, resulting in the closest ties these countries have had in the post-Cold War era.’
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May 30, 2021
Postscript: China Doubts U.S. Allies Support
'Chinese leadership is also cynical about the effectiveness of a U.S.-led Cold War-style bloc.’
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May 30, 2021
Biden’s ‘Anti-China Bloc’
‘Throughout President Joe Biden’s first 100 days in office, his administration has largely continued the Trump administration’s hawkish approach toward China.’ ‘President Biden has also made international coalition building to confront the growing power and influence of China his primary foreign policy initiative.’ ‘Chinese leaders and the public are not convinced by the statements recently made by President Biden that these U.S.-led alliances are “not anti-Chinese” and that the United States is “not looking for confrontation” with China.’
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May 30, 2021
What China Thinks About Biden's China Policy
And that is what makes Cheng Li’s ‘Biden’s China strategy: Coalition-driven competition or Cold War-style confrontation?' so valuable. Cheng has decades of close relationships with China’s leaders and high officials. They trust him not to attribute their comments and so speak freely and honestly to him. Cheng is the person I rely on most to convey China’s positions.
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May 30, 2021
Worse for China than Trump
‘Many Chinese now believe that the Biden administration could be more detrimental to U.S.-China relations than the Trump administration.’
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May 30, 2021
'Biden’s China strategy: Coalition-driven competition or Cold War-style confrontation?'
‘Senior officials on the foreign policy team have frequently emphasized three “C” words: competition, cooperation, and confrontation.’
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May 30, 2021
The Trump Legacy
‘From Beijing’s perspective, the hawkish approach to China in the final year of the Trump administration revealed that the Trump team sought to defeat and destroy China in much the same way that the United States defeated the Soviet Union in the Cold War.’
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May 27, 2021
'China Bets on Productivity Over Population to Drive Its Economy'
‘Beijing has a two-pronged approach to maintaining economic growth as its population shrinks.’ ‘First, it intends to slow the decline of the urban workforce by raising the retirement age and encouraging migration of more of the country’s 510 million rural residents to cities.’ ‘Second, it plans to raise productivity -- a measure of economic output per worker -- with the latest five-year plan emphasizing better vocational education and more investment in scientific research, automation and digital infrastructure.’ [see second chart above]
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May 27, 2021
'Why Demographics is (Close to) Destiny'
‘Demographics may not be destiny, but for students of geopolitics, they come close.’
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May 27, 2021
'Lousy demographics will not stop China’s rise'
‘The old maxim ‘demography is destiny’ no longer holds in the same way that it used to.’ ‘A shrinking and ageing population may not have the same gloomy implications in the 21st century.’
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May 27, 2021
'Sex and the Chinese Economy'
‘A rise in China’s male-female ratio may have contributed to between one-third and one-half of the increase in its trade surplus with other countries.’ ‘The sex imbalance thus likely underpins an important source of tension between China and the US. Yet bilateral engagement has paid scant attention to this linkage.’
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May 27, 2021
'Demography + Technology is Destiny'
The census showed that the number of births nationwide fell to the lowest level since 1961, following a nationwide, manmade, famine caused by Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” that killed tens of millions of people, and that China’s total population could peak in the next few years.
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May 27, 2021
'China: Births Falling'
‘China’s total population could peak in the next few years, spurring profound changes for the world’s second-biggest economy.’
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May 27, 2021
'Demography + Technology is Destiny'
The census showed that the number of births nationwide fell to the lowest level since 1961, following a nationwide, manmade, famine caused by Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” that killed tens of millions of people, and that China’s total population could peak in the next few years.
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May 27, 2021
'China: Getting Old Before Getting Rich'
‘Over the past two generations, China has seen a collapse in fertility, exacerbated by Beijing’s ruthless population-control programs.’ ‘With decades of extremely low fertility in its immediate past, decades more of that to come, and no likelihood of mass immigration, China will see its population peak by 2027.’
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May 27, 2021
'China Bets on Productivity Over Population to Drive Its Economy'
‘Beijing has a two-pronged approach to maintaining economic growth as its population shrinks.’ ‘First, it intends to slow the decline of the urban workforce by raising the retirement age and encouraging migration of more of the country’s 510 million rural residents to cities.’ ‘Second, it plans to raise productivity -- a measure of economic output per worker -- with the latest five-year plan emphasizing better vocational education and more investment in scientific research, automation and digital infrastructure.’ [see second chart above]
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May 27, 2021
'China: Getting Old Before Getting Rich'
‘Over the past two generations, China has seen a collapse in fertility, exacerbated by Beijing’s ruthless population-control programs.’ ‘With decades of extremely low fertility in its immediate past, decades more of that to come, and no likelihood of mass immigration, China will see its population peak by 2027.’
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May 27, 2021
'China: Births Falling'
‘China’s total population could peak in the next few years, spurring profound changes for the world’s second-biggest economy.’
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May 27, 2021
'Why Demographics is (Close to) Destiny'
‘Demographics may not be destiny, but for students of geopolitics, they come close.’
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May 27, 2021
'Sex and the Chinese Economy'
‘A rise in China’s male-female ratio may have contributed to between one-third and one-half of the increase in its trade surplus with other countries.’ ‘The sex imbalance thus likely underpins an important source of tension between China and the US. Yet bilateral engagement has paid scant attention to this linkage.’
keep reading
May 27, 2021
'Lousy demographics will not stop China’s rise'
‘The old maxim ‘demography is destiny’ no longer holds in the same way that it used to.’ ‘A shrinking and ageing population may not have the same gloomy implications in the 21st century.’
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May 20, 2021
'Apple in China: No Plan B'
“This business model only really fits and works in China. But then you’re married to China.” ‘The Chinese government was starting to pass laws that gave the country greater leverage over Apple, and Mr. Xi would soon start seeking concessions. Apple had no Plan B.’
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May 20, 2021
'Tim Cook and Apple Bet Everything on China.'
‘For Apple, a clean break with China is impossible.’
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May 20, 2021
'Apple held hostage by its Chinese puzzle'
"The massive and complete supply chain ecosystem in China is key to the iPhone maker's success, but it has also created a gigantic organism that would struggle to move somewhere else."
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May 20, 2021
‘Censorship, Surveillance and Profits: A Hard Bargain for Apple in China’
‘Apple built the world’s most valuable business on top of China. Now it has to answer to the Chinese government.’
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May 20, 2021
Apple in China
‘But just as Mr. Cook figured out how to make China work for Apple, China is making Apple work for the Chinese government.’ ‘Behind the scenes, Apple has constructed a bureaucracy that has become a powerful tool in China’s vast censorship operation.’
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May 20, 2021
'Apple Reaches $2 Trillion'
“This business model only really fits and works in China. But then you’re married to China.” ‘The Chinese government was starting to pass laws that gave the country greater leverage over Apple, and Mr. Xi would soon start seeking concessions. Apple had no Plan B.’
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May 15, 2021
‘Scenario Three: Leadership Challenge or Coup
‘By removing de jure term limits on the office of the presidency — and thus far refusing to nominate his successor for this and his other leadership positions — Xi has solidified his own authority at the expense of the most important political reform of the last four decades: the regular and peaceful transfer of power.’
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May 15, 2021
Invitation to a Trivium Flash Talk: 'China's Data Environment from a Big-Picture Perspective.’
‘This talk is designed to cut through the tech and legal jargon, and lay out the top-level strategic rationale underpinning China's thinking on data. We'll cover:’
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May 15, 2021
Invitation to a Trivium Flash Talk: 'China's Data Environment from a Big-Picture Perspective.’
‘This talk is designed to cut through the tech and legal jargon, and lay out the top-level strategic rationale underpinning China's thinking on data. We'll cover:’
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May 15, 2021
After Xi: A Succession Crisis to Rock the World
A new risk to add to your analyses and strategic planning: A succession crisis in China. By removing term limits on his stay in office and by not naming a successor, Secretary General Xi Jinping ‘has pushed China towards a potential destabilising succession crisis, one with profound implications for the international order and global commerce,’ writes Richard McGregor of the Lowy Institute and Jude Blanchette of the Center for Strategic & International Studies
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May 15, 2021
‘Scenario Four: Unexpected Death or Incapacitation'
‘Even if the CCP’s claim that Xi Jinping has no designs to remain in office for life is true, his evisceration of succession norms leaves the country ill-prepared for his sudden death or incapacitation.’
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May 15, 2021
'Regime change in China is not only possible, it is imperative.'
‘We must make regime change in China the highest goal of our strategy towards that country.’ ‘The US and its allies cannot dictate to China the political system by which it is governed. But they can and must engineer conditions which embolden and enable those in China who also want regime change to achieve it.’
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May 15, 2021
After Xi: A Succession Crisis to Rock the World
A new risk to add to your analyses and strategic planning: A succession crisis in China. By removing term limits on his stay in office and by not naming a successor, Secretary General Xi Jinping ‘has pushed China towards a potential destabilising succession crisis, one with profound implications for the international order and global commerce,’ writes Richard McGregor of the Lowy Institute and Jude Blanchette of the Center for Strategic & International Studies
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May 15, 2021
'Regime change in China is not only possible, it is imperative.'
‘We must make regime change in China the highest goal of our strategy towards that country.’ ‘The US and its allies cannot dictate to China the political system by which it is governed. But they can and must engineer conditions which embolden and enable those in China who also want regime change to achieve it.’
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May 15, 2021
'After Xi: China's potentially destabilising succession crisis'
‘By removing de jure term limits on the office of the presidency — and thus far refusing to nominate his successor for this and his other leadership positions — Xi has solidified his own authority at the expense of the most important political reform of the last four decades: the regular and peaceful transfer of power.’ ‘In doing so, he has pushed China towards a potential destabilising succession crisis, one with profound implications for the international order and global commerce.’
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May 15, 2021
‘Scenario One & Two: Xi Steps Down'
‘In this scenario, Xi thwarts the current consensus by handing over his leadership positions to at least one individual from the current Politburo Standing Committee (as per existing regulations).’
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May 12, 2021
The Poem that Cost Billions
The billion dollar losses that came from quoting an 1,100-year-old poem, toWhy foreign companies in China have Stockholm Syndrome
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May 10, 2021
'A 1,100-Year-Old Poem Cost Meituan’s Outspoken CEO US $2.5 Billions'
‘On Monday, because of an 1,100-year old poem about events 2,200 years ago posted by the founder of food delivery giant Meituan, investors panicked, and sank the company’s market cap by $15.6 billion. And Meituan CEO Wang Xing, who posted the poem, lost $2.5 billion of his wealth.’
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May 9, 2021
'The Housing Bubble That Just Won’t Pop'
‘China’s cities are plagued by a diverging trend: high demand and exorbitant prices for residential properties in tier 1 cities and yet an oversupply in smaller, lower-tiered cities.’
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May 7, 2021
'Would China really invade Taiwan?'
‘Is Taiwan really "the most dangerous place on earth?" No. Or at least, not right now.’
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May 7, 2021
'Don't Help China By Hyping Risk Of War Over Taiwan'
‘China is marshaling its full range of capabilities to intensify pressure on Taiwan below the threshold of conflict.’ ‘Beijing's goal is to constantly remind Taiwan's people of its growing power, induce pessimism about Taiwan's future, deepen splits within the island's political system and show that outside powers are impotent to counter its flexes.' ‘Its approach is guided by the Chinese aphorism, "Once ripe, the melon will drop from its stem [瓜熟蒂落]," ’‘This strategy may require more time than war, but it would come at less cost and risk to Beijing.’
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May 7, 2021
'China Threat: A "perception gap" between the U.S. and Taiwan'
‘While the U.S. talks up the medium-term military threat, the democratic island sees the moves as part of a bigger, more immediate problem: "gray zone" warfare from Beijing that is meant to wear down the morale of not just the Taiwanese military, but also the island's people.’
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May 7, 2021
'The most dangerous place on Earth'
‘Taiwan is an arena for the rivalry between China and America.’ ‘Although the United States is not treaty-bound to defend Taiwan, a Chinese assault would be a test of America’s military might and its diplomatic and political resolve.’
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May 7, 2021
'The Most Dangerous Place on Earth'
‘China's top priority now and in the foreseeable future is to deter Taiwan independence rather than compel unification,’ note Richard Bush (Brookings (retired)), Bonnie Glaser (German Marshall Fund in America), and Ryan Hass (Brookings Institution)
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May 7, 2021
'Another China-Related Risk for Investors & Corporations: Taiwan'
"Taiwan poses the biggest geopolitical risk in Asia and is likely to only increase, a reason it has to be built into investors’ [and corporates' models]" according to Arthur Kroeber, head of research at Gavekal.
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May 5, 2021
'Western companies in China succumb to Stockholm syndrome'
‘Senator Marco Rubio of Florida has a point when he calls Delta Air Lines “the height of hypocrisy” for opposing voter legislation in the US state of Georgia while partnering with a government he accuses of being “actively engaged in genocide” in Xinjiang.’
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May 4, 2021
'The Surprising Strength of Chinese-Japanese Ties'
At their summit in April, ‘after years of veiled messaging Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga U.S. President Joe Biden, ‘formally acknowledged that they are working together to deter China’s military power in Asia and compete with China economically.’
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May 3, 2021
'How Will the Digital Renminbi Change China?'
‘China's new digital renminbi by itself will not help the currency to challenge the US dollar’s global dominance.’ ‘Its true significance instead lies in its potential to shift the competitive balance of power between the country’s technology giants and traditional banks.’
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May 2, 2021
'Fanning the Flames of War'
I recently received an email from a former U.S. ambassador and influential senior foreign policy expert taking me to task for publishing so many hawkish posts about U.S. policy toward China in the ‘China Macro Reporter.’ These are, he said, ‘in some ways fanning the flames of a potential war. Please back down, at least a bit.’ ‘This is not the Malcolm I remember or know,’ he ended.
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May 2, 2021
‘A trend for hostility toward China, inflamed under Trump, is a recipe for American failure’
‘A trend for hostility toward China, inflamed under Trump, is a recipe for American failure.’ ‘Hostility toward China, much of it misinformed historically and strategically, has deepened in the United States in recent years, with a consensus hardening among both Republicans and Democrats that China is at root an adversary that must be thwarted.’ ‘Four years under President Donald Trump have enlarged and inflamed that trend, but it is a recipe for American failure.’ ‘The Joe Biden administration needs to seriously rethink Washington’s approach to Beijing.’
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April 30, 2021
'World Economic Outlook, April 2021: Managing Divergent Recoveries'
‘The upgrades in global growth for 2021 and 2022 are mainly due to upgrades for advanced economies, particularly to a sizeable upgrade for the United States (1.3 percentage points) that is expected to grow at 6.4 percent this year.
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April 29, 2021
Biden China Policy: What We Know at the 100 Day Mark
Friday, April 30, marks 100 days of the Biden Presidency.On Thursday, President Biden gave a speech to a Joint Session of Congress that summed up many of policies – including those on China - as he nears the 100-day mark.And several major media outlets and think tanks are getting an early start on their analyses.Here's Senator Lindsey Graham: "I'm not very impressed with the first 100 days.”‘ "He's been a disaster on foreign policy.” ’‘ “Russia and China are already pushing him around, so I'm very worried." ’
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April 29, 2021
'Biden’s First 100 Days: Setting the Table for U.S.-China Strategic Competition'
‘Biden is focused on accumulating as much leverage as possible to deal with China from a position of strength and to dispel the growing Chinese perception that the United States is a power in decline.’
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April 29, 2021
'What Joe Biden Said About China in His First Speech to Joint Session of Congress'
“We’re in competition with China and other countries to win the 21st Century.”
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April 29, 2021
'Biden's Speech Calls for U.S. to Take On China and Russia'
‘President Biden justified his broad vision to remake the American economy as the necessary step to survive long-run competition with China
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April 29, 2021
'What does Biden’s first 100 days tell us about his approach to China?'
‘What we have learned from the first 100 days is that we are likely to have both a confrontational and competitive relationship with China, similar to Trump’s policy but with some important nuances.’
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April 29, 2021
'China's Response to Biden's Speech'
‘It is natural for the two sides to have competition in some fields, but we should advocate fair competition, like competing with each other for excellence in a racing field, not beating each other on a wrestling arena.’
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April 26, 2021
'The New Age of Autarky'
‘The United States, China, and India are each now engaged in what seems like a paradoxical enterprise: the quest to increase their global status while also turning inward to become more self-sufficient.’
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April 26, 2021
'China Inside Out: A Conversation with Susan Shirk & Tony Saich'
‘The centralization of power, quite predictably, leads to this kind of echo chamber effect, which is really quite dangerous. And it's something that we should be factoring in when we think about how to deal with China now.’
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April 24, 2021
'Xinhua News Agency on the "Strategic Competition Act of 2021" in the U.S.' | 新华社评美“2021年战略竞争法案”
‘The bill is full of Cold War mentality and ideological prejudice, wantonly misinterpreting, slandering and discrediting China's development strategy and domestic and foreign policies, and grossly interfering in China's internal affairs.’
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April 23, 2021
'A new era of bipartisanship on China in Congress?
‘The Strategic Competition Act codifies a bipartisan U.S. position on a range of China-related issues and telegraphs to U.S. allies the federal government is unified.’
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April 23, 2021
'Xi at the Climate Summit: Domestic Obstacles to Carbon Neutrality'
‘Xi’s reticence at the summit could be driven by domestic considerations. He needs to balance divergent interests between domestic industrial groups and international expectations, the need to show China’s green image and also not be seen as caving to U.S. diplomatic pressure.’
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April 21, 2021
‘Scenario One & Two: Xi Steps Down'
‘In this scenario, Xi thwarts the current consensus by handing over his leadership positions to at least one individual from the current Politburo Standing Committee (as per existing regulations).’
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April 21, 2021
'Threat of Chinese sanctions tests Japan's resolve on Taiwan'
"We advise Japan to stay away from the Taiwan question. The deeper it is embroiled in, the bigger the price it will pay." Communist Party-backed Global Times' editorial.
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April 21, 2021
‘Scenario Four: Unexpected Death or Incapacitation'
‘Even if the CCP’s claim that Xi Jinping has no designs to remain in office for life is true, his evisceration of succession norms leaves the country ill-prepared for his sudden death or incapacitation.’
keep reading
April 21, 2021
‘Scenario Three: Leadership Challenge or Coup
‘By removing de jure term limits on the office of the presidency — and thus far refusing to nominate his successor for this and his other leadership positions — Xi has solidified his own authority at the expense of the most important political reform of the last four decades: the regular and peaceful transfer of power.’
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April 20, 2021
'Xi calls for new world order (again)'
‘We must not let the rules set by one or a few countries be imposed on others, or allow unilateralism pursued by certain countries [read America] to set the pace for the whole world.’
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April 20, 2021
'Beijing won total control of Hong Kong. Now, the "brainwashing" begins.'
April 15 was not a normal Thursday in Hong Kong. That occasion, the first “National Security Education Day” since China imposed a tough security law in June, was the most visible display of Hong Kong’s fall from a relatively free, boisterous territory to an ­Orwellian place that resembles the repressive mainland.’
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April 19, 2021
‘The US-Japan Joint Statement grossly interferes in China's domestic affairs'
‘The US-Japan Joint Leaders' Statement grossly interferes in China's domestic affairs and severely violates basic norms governing international relations. China deplores and rejects it.’
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April 19, 2021
'Tokyo Flexes Its Talons'
‘The alliance with Japan is the single most important international relationship America has.’
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April 18, 2021
'Taiwan in US-Japan statement: show of resolve or diplomatic calculus?'
"The statement shunned more specific language like 'defend Taiwan' to avoid unnecessarily provoking China."
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April 17, 2021
'Is growth in China soaring or slowing?: The answer depends on how you calculate growth'
‘It was China’s fastest growth on record, underlining the strength of its recovery. Yet it also illustrates the oddities in how GDP is reported.’
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April 17, 2021
'Margaret Ng's Statement at Conclusion of Today's Trial'
‘There is no right so precious to the people of Hong Kong as the freedom of expression and the freedom of peaceful assembly.’
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April 16, 2021
U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement: “U.S. - JAPAN GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR A NEW ERA”
‘President Biden and Prime Minister Suga exchanged views on the impact of China’s actions on peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and the world, and shared their concerns over Chinese activities that are inconsistent with the international rules-based order, including the use of economic and other forms of coercion.’
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'The competitiveness of China is eroding.'

Understanding the drivers of China’s rise to supply chain prominence gives (me anyway) insights to help analyze the changes – or not – of ‘decoupling.’
by

|

CHINADebate

June 12, 2022
'The competitiveness of China is eroding.'
Dr. Willy Shih, Harvard Business School

The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, created by and reporting to the United States Congress held an all-day hearing last week on:

  • ‘U.S.-China Competition in Global Supply Chains’

As usual the Commission brought in top experts to give testimony.

There are great descriptions of specific supply chains, such as semiconductors and rare earth.

  • But what I found especially interesting is the brief explanations of how China became crucial to so many supply chains.

In this regard, two essays stand out by  

  • Willy Shih, professor at Harvard Business School and
  • David J. Bulman, professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Understanding the drivers of China’s rise to supply chain prominence gives (me anyway) insights to help analyze the changes – or not – of ‘decoupling.’

  • Excerpts from both essays are below.  

All the essays are excellent and worth a browse to find those that fit your interest.

Part One | 'The competitiveness of China is eroding': Willy Shih, HBS

‘China was late to industrialize, relative to the U.S., Europe, and other East Asian countries.

  • ‘In that regard it had what some authors call the “late comers’ advantage.” ’

‘When it built its electric grid, its communications network, and a fair amount of its manufacturing capacity, it didn’t have a lot of existing (and older) infrastructure that was already paid for and fully depreciated, or maybe State-owned Enterprises (SOE) didn’t have to worry about concepts like depreciation schedules.’

  • ‘In either case, since it was looking to catch up, it could start fresh with the newest technologies, and this was a huge ’

‘Some of the old Mao era manufacturing legacy was pretty archaic, but firms weren’t afraid to invest in a lot of new capacity.’

  • ‘They planned for vast growth with the domestic market and increasing access to global markets.’

2 | ‘A lot of know-how embedded in those production tools’

‘In China during the 1990s and 2000s, a period of rapid industrialization, both Chinese and foreign-invested companies imported a great deal of production equipment.’

  • ‘Some of this was the result of “lift and shift” strategies in which production equipment was moved from the S. or Europe, but there were also many instances where the latest production technologies and equipment were purchased, largely from abroad.’

‘The equipment generally comes with training, as it is in the interest of the toolmakers to provide it.’

  • ‘They therefore received a lot of know-how embedded in those production tools. I have written about this phenomena in the MIT Sloan Management Review, and I am incorporating that article by reference.’
  • ‘That is something everybody in every country does, but if you are a latecomer, it helps when you don’t have to go through a lot of learning that is abstracted and presented to you.’

3 | ‘Centralized planning with experimentation’

‘Let me add that China historically engaged in a unique combination of centralized planning with experimentation.’

  • ‘In addition to its Five-Year Plans, it engages in longer-term programs as well.’

‘I would like to highlight in particular the National High-tech R&D Program, also known as the “863 Program” named for the year and month (March, 1986) when four scholars proposed a plan to accelerate the country’s high tech development.’

  • ‘It sought to boost innovation capacity in named strategic sectors like information technologies and infrastructure, biological and pharmaceutical technologies, nanomaterials and other materials, among others.’

‘China also has a fierce form of market competition, and it is driven by policymakers in provinces and cities who take plans handed down from Beijing and implement them with their own means and methods, competing fiercely with each other.’

  • ‘For those leaders who are successful, this is a path to promotion within the Chinese Communist Party.’
  • ‘Sometimes Beijing tries to tone down this hyper-competition and rationalize markets, deeming it a waste of resources. But it’s an interesting and powerful model that had delivered results.’

4 | ‘The pandemic revealed a lot of surprise dependencies.’

‘China’s position in global supply chains is much more pervasive than many people realize.’

  • ‘It has combined what seemed like (until a few years ago) a virtually unlimited low-cost workforce that had both the discipline and the ambition to get ahead.’
  • ‘Workers there were willing to do things that American workers were not, and they did it for a tenth the cost or sometimes even ’

‘While many people focus on the high profile products like lithium-ion batteries, computers, communications equipment, or pharmaceuticals, we actually have broad dependencies that run much deeper than most Americans realize.’

  • ‘Do you shop at the big box home improvement stores or retailers? All you have to do is look at who the largest importers from China are.’

‘In the midst of the supply chain crisis that we have been living through for the past two years, imports from China have posted records month after month, because we don’t have anywhere else to go to for a lot of manufacturing capacity.’

  • ‘The pandemic revealed a lot of surprise dependencies, and I guarantee there are many more.’

5 | ‘Economies of scale and process learning’

‘China’s position is durable, though not insurmountable, because they have both the capacity and the capabilities.’

  • ‘If you want to assemble 10 million iPhones in preparation for a launch weekend, there is only one place where you can marshal the labor, enjoy the labor flexibility, and do it at a reasonable cost, at scale.’

‘Chinese companies have been willing and able to apply the latest process innovations.

  • ‘They then use learning and economies of scale to cement their ’

‘Economies of scale and process learning as exemplified by the learning curve play a crucial role.’

  • ‘These effects overlap of course, but let me start with scale economies.’

6 | ‘Economies of scale’

‘Economies of scale are cost decreases that result from expanding production.’

  • ‘If the cost per unit of output rises more slowly than the costs of inputs in the same proportions, there are economies of scale (for example, if output doubles while the total cost of inputs less than doubles).’
  • ‘The simplest scale economies arise when there are high setup costs and relatively low run costs per unit of output so that spreading setup over larger run volumes improves efficiency of labor and asset utilization.’

‘Economies of scale are frequently found in industries that require large capital expenditures on plant and equipment, or the establishment of a large infrastructure prior to the ability to begin providing service.’

  • ‘High fixed costs get apportioned across the entire product volumes, so larger production volumes mean a smaller per unit allocation.’

‘China has been able to take advantage of the tradability of its output, and as a low-cost provider combine the gigantic export market with its own growing domestic market.’

  • ‘This is something that the United States was able to take advantage of during the 20th century, but the growth of the tradable sector enabled by low-cost ocean container shipping from the late 1990s has helped China immensely.’
  • ‘Thus its firms have been able to build extraordinary positions as low cost ’

7 | ‘Process learning is essential’

‘Process learning is essential.

  • ‘The experience (learning) curve originated from the work of Theodore Wright, who studied aircraft production.’
  • ‘He observed that the more times a task was repeated, the less labor time was required in each subsequent iteration’.

‘Experience curve benefits can be attributed to improvements in labor efficiency as workers’ dexterity improves, standardization, specialization and work method improvements, improved use of tools and equipment, product redesigns to improve assembly efficiency and productivity, material substitutions and more efficient use of inputs, and a shared experience effect when multiple products share usage of common resources.’

8 | “Paying my tuition”

‘One of the key benefits that I have observed Chinese manufacturers have been able to exploit is a market breadth and depth that facilitates this learning.’

  • ‘When a firm starts out making a product, it might not be as good as international competitors, but it is good enough for many buyers in its local market.’
  • ‘Thus it is able to get practice and move down the learning curve.’
  • ‘Customers pay for this learning by buying the firm’s output, and this gives the manufacturer the cash flow to keep operating and ’
  • ‘I describe this as “paying my tuition” while I learn and improve.’

‘China didn’t invent this idea – it is a feature of market economies.’

  • ‘Japan and other Asian economies leveraged this earlier, as did the S. in the 19th and 20th centuries. But a broad tradable sector with low cost shipping facilitates it.’

9 | ‘The competitiveness of China is eroding.’

‘In my opinion the competitiveness of China is eroding, and I would attribute this to several factors:’

  • ‘Increasing logistics costs and transit times, essentially eroding the tradability of many If you don’t have sufficient value density, it makes no economic sense to produce physical products that far away from where they are sold. Since 90% of global trade moves on water- borne trade lanes, the arrival of IMO 2023 regulations on shipping suggest to me that we are not going back to the days of the first 15 years of this century.’
  • ‘China’s population dividend has peaked, and demographic trends are not in its ’ China’s workforce is no longer seemingly limitless, and workers are demanding more pay. That die was cast with the country’s one-child policy, and there is no correcting that in the near term.’
  • ‘Heightened trade tensions between the U.S. and China have made manufacturing some commodities too high risk, and we have already seen the beginnings of a lot of
  • ‘China’s Zero Covid policy has made business much harder to conduct, and has injected a major degree of risk uncertainty. Manufacturers really dislike uncertainty.’
  • ‘The Chinese government’s willing to disrupt some of its own industries through policy and regulation have injected more uncertainty. Until the Party Congress later this year, this uncertainty is likely to continue.’

10 | ‘I am not prepared to write off China’s long-term capabilities.’

‘Meaningful shifts in production have already, and continue to take place. Countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, and Mexico have seen gains.’

  • ‘Having said this, I am not prepared to write off China’s long-term capabilities or its ability to react and respond to these shifts.’

Part Two | How China became dominant in global supply chains: David J. Bulman  


1 | ‘China’s deep integration into global supply chains’: four factors

‘From 1978 until the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, China transitioned from a nearly autarkic country to the world’s largest manufacturer and goods exporter.’

‘China’s deep integration into global supply chains in this period was enabled by:’

  1. ‘serendipitous timing given concurrent global developments,’
  2. ‘East Asian geography, ‘
  3. ‘natural comparative advantage, and’
  4. ‘policy choices, particularly trade and market liberalization. During this period, industrial policies to strengthen China’s position in global supply chains were limited in scope and effectiveness.’

‘Industrial sectors exhibit wide variation in terms of both central policy support and China’s level of global supply chain centrality/dominance.’

  • ‘These two dimensions combine to create a 2x2 matrix, seen in the Table above.’

2 | Timing

‘China’s entry into the global trading system from 1978 through 2008 coincided with a new wave of globalization and global value chain development driven by the information and communications technology (ICT) revolution and declining transportation costs.’

  • ‘The ICT revolution significantly lowered costs of outsourcing and related services, including financial services, computer and information services, and other business services, which could increasingly be traded internationally.’
  • ‘Technological developments in transportation led to lower costs for air and ocean ’

3 | East Asian geography

‘China’s centrality in an increasingly integrated East Asian region facilitated China’s entry into global supply chains.’

  • ‘East Asia has led the way globally in terms of explicit support for developing regional value chains, as trade policies have consistently ensured low tariffs on intermediate goods through a rapid increase in regional preferential trade agreements (PTA), which expanded from 3 in 2000 to 37 a decade later, with a further 72 under negotiation.’
  • ‘China took full advantage of these PTAs, implementing 13 PTAs with 21 individual economies and negotiating at least 10 more, including the 16-member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). And GVC complementarities have been an important factor in determining China’s choice of PTA partner.’

4 | Chinese diaspora

‘China’s geographic centrality within Asia also played an important role given the extensive regional Chinese diaspora.’

  • ‘Early foreign direct investment (FDI) into China in the 1980s and 1990s was driven by investment from Hong Kong,Taiwan, Singapore, and other Asian neighbors with large ethnic Chinese populations, constituting a “China circle.” ’
  • ‘As industrial production in the East Asian “tigers” moved up the value chain, China became the natural destination for outsourcing given these language and cultural ties.’
  • ‘In this sense, much of China’s rising GVC integration should be considered as relocated intra-Asian Asian trade.’

5 | Comparative advantage: a relatively educated low-cost workforce

‘Centrality in East Asia only mattered given China’s comparative advantages: most importantly, a large, relatively well-educated, and low-cost workforce.’

  • ‘Mao era (1949-1976) policies, despite causing economic inefficiency and human disasters, also led to considerable increases in human capital: life expectancy rose from 40 years to 68 years and literacy rose from 10% to 90%, both well above other countries at China’s level of per capita income, and the population itself grew from 540 million to nearly one billion.’
  • ‘Consequently, China entered the 1980s with a massive and relatively well-educated work force.’

‘Additionally, Mao policies restricting urbanization beginning in the late 1950s resulted in over 80% of the population remaining underemployed in rural areas, leading to a huge surplus rural labor population that could migrate for work to urban areas without driving up wage pressures.6 Along with an urban workforce with higher levels of education, China thus had an ideal combination of supervisory manpower and a vast pool of unskilled workers.’

  • ‘As a sign of the importance of low-cost labor, China’s labor-intensive exports as a share of total exports rose from 37% in 1984 to 54% in 1994.’

‘In addition to China’s well-educated yet cheap labor force, China’s huge size and relatively well-developed infrastructure (see below) also provided firms with the option to relocate production within the country.’

  • ‘This was particularly important given that GVC development and firm de- verticalization partially reshuffled global comparative advantages in trade, as GVCs required the capacity for inter-industry reallocation of inputs as well as the ability to support the operations of multinational firms.’

6 | Policy choices: trade liberalization

‘Yet the single most important factor in china's global trade dominance has been the productivity gains enabled by state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform and private sector entry in the 1990s and 2000s, and this market liberalization was itself enabled by earlier trade liberalization.’

  • ‘In this sense China’s most important policy choices were to support market-driven growth.’

‘On trade liberalization, in the 1980s China began to de-monopolize its Mao era foreign trade regime, under which the currency was entirely non-convertible, only12 foreign trade corporations (FTC) were allowed to conduct cross-border trade, and an export plan covered all of China’s exports.’

  • ‘Gradually, ministries, local governments, and special economic zones were allowed to set up FTCs, and by the late 1990s China had granted direct export/import rights to 10,000 manufacturing companies.
  • ‘By 1991, only15% of exports were covered in the plan.’

‘And from a highly overvalued currency, China in the mid-1990s moved to a market-based currency convertible on the current account.’

‘At the time, China replaced non-tariff administrative barriers to trade with high tariffs, but over the course of the 1990s these high tariffs were reduced below the developing country average to pave the way for WTO liberalization.’

7 | Policy choices: targeted support for export processing

‘Trade liberalization also included explicit policy choices to attract FDI and engage in export processing.’

  • ‘But for the most part these policies were broad-based and not targeted at the development of specific’

‘Policy makers established four SEZs in Guangdong and Fujian in 1979 – enclaves that did not threaten China’s system of domestic production—followed by 14 open cities in 1984.’

  • ‘They also created a 1986 Coastal Development Plan with explicit support for export processing that brought SEZ-type policies to China’s entire coastal region, with hundreds of millions of potential workers.’
  • ‘Export processing was exempt from duties on imported inputs, providing an important cost’
  • ‘And foreign-invested enterprises (FIE) did not have to go through FTCs to import, while also receiving special tax concessions.’
  • ‘China’s export processing trade subsequently reached as high as 56% of total exports by 1996.’

8 | Infrastructure

‘Beyond SEZs and export processing tax break policies—policies which China learned from Asia and the rest of the world - explicit attention to infrastructure development and to decentralization helped to attract FDI.’

  • ‘China spent lavishly on infrastructure, including roads, railways, ports, and telecommunications; by the mid-2000s, despite remaining a lower middle-income country, China’s infrastructure stock was similar to advanced economies, and China’s logistics performance rose well ahead of other middle income countries.’

‘Part of this infrastructure performance was driven by competition between local governments to attract investment: in the 1980s, China developed a regionally decentralized form of authoritarianism in which local officials were incentivized to attract FDI to boost economic growth and thus their career prospects.’

  • ‘Localities competed with each other by providing preferential policies including cheap land and tax breaks, and also by improving local ’
  • ‘This led to uncoordinated competition, as well as intra-national cross-border  protectionism .’
  • ‘But it also led to institutional improvements, as foreign firms were attracted to Chinese cities with more reliable contract enforcement and faster customs clearance.’

‘These policy reforms paved the way for foreign firms to help drive China’s initial export explosion.’

  • ‘The FIE share of exports rose from nothing in the late 1970s to 58% in 2005.’

9 | Reform

‘FDI helped drive China’s growth, but trade liberalization’s most important contribution was inducing international competition that forced deep reforms to China’s enterprise system, enabling  the entry of private  sector firms and the closure of inefficient SOEs.’

  • ‘During China’s most rapid period of economic growth in the early 2000s, productivity gains across manufacturing sub-sectors were systematically correlated with levels of tariff reductions; sectors with greater tariff reduction experienced more private sector entry and greater competitive pressures that resulted in improved SOE ’

‘Trade liberalization also helped to improve China’s institutions, as WTO accession spurred China to abolish, revise, or introduce more than 300 national laws and nearly 200,000 local regulations; such institutional reforms further helped to provide secure property rights for private and foreign firms.’

  • ‘Consequently, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, SOEs shed approximately 40 million workers.
  • ‘SOEs accounted for over two-thirds of China’s exports as late as 1995, but by 2016 accounted for only 10% of exports as the domestic private sector took off.’

10 | Industrial policy under Xi

‘China has increasingly relied on sector-specific industrial policies.’

  • ‘Butthesepolicies are predominantly implemented by local governments whose incentives are not aligned with the long-term growth objectives pursued by the’

‘These officials instead seek to maximize short term growth and minimize creative destruction and attendant unemployment.’

  • ‘Xi’s institutional reforms have not altered this calculus.’

‘Consequently, industrial policy as implemented is much less effective than U.S.policy makers often assume.’

  • ‘This is not to say that all of China’s industrial policies fail, but rather that their efficacy and explanatory power regarding broader industrial and exporting trends in China is overstated.’